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THE NEW MCCARTHYISM: HOW THE MASSACHUSETTS
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT GOT AUTOMATED LICENSE
PLATE READERS AND THE MOSAIC THEORY ALL WRONG
Dan Noffsinger*
Abstract
Many scholars have explored the intersection of 21st-century
technologies with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Some have
approached this as digital-age versions of papers, effects, and the
curtilage, while others have addressed the third-party Miller doctrine.
One theory gaining support, based partly on the concurring Supreme
Court opinions of United States v. Jones, is the Mosaic Theory, which
argues that data collection that is constitutional in isolation can aggregate
to create an unconstitutional intrusion. One underexplored area is its
intersection with automated license plate readers (ALPRs). Multiple
authors have argued for the Mosaic Theory’s application to limit or ban
ALPRs, and in 2020, Massachusetts’ highest court held that the Fourth
Amendment could be violated by less than a year’s use of ALPRs. This
Note criticizes that ruling and fills the gap in the literature by examining
how the Mosaic Theory, despite sounding promising on paper, would be
unworkable in practice regarding ALPRs and unlikely to be approved by
the Supreme Court. This Note instead proposes alternatives to limit the
growing reach of ALPRs.
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INTRODUCTION
In the race to identify rioters at the U.S. Capitol during the attack on
January 6, 2021, an often-overlooked technology, nearly invisible in
commuters’ daily lives, played a key role—Automated License Plate
Readers.1 ALPRs2 “can do in minutes what it took a cop to do in an entire
shift,”3 as they are mounted in various locations or on police cars, where
they can capture upwards of 2,000 plates per minute.4 Even when cars
travel in excess of 100 miles per hour, artificial intelligence5 extracts the
plate number from the photograph with 97–99% accuracy6 and records it
along with the date, time, and location.7 In an instant, ALPR systems can
1. Drew Harwell and Craig Timberg, How America’s Surveillance Networks Helped the
FBI Catch the Capitol Mob, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/technology/2021/04/02/capitol-siege-arrests-technology-fbi-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/
R5ZZ-62PP].
2. Different sources use ALPR and LPR, with and without an apostrophe in the plural
form, nearly interchangeably.
3. Tod Newcombe, States Start Restricting Police License Plate Readers, GOVERNING
(Aug. 12, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://www.governing.com/columns/tech-talk/gov-automated-license
-plate-readers-police.html [https://perma.cc/VP2G-KU9E].
4. Justin Rohrlich, In Just Two Years, 9,000 of These Cameras Were Installed to Spy on
Your Car, QUARTZ (Feb. 5, 2019), https://qz.com/1540488/in-just-two-years-9000-of-thesecameras-were-installed-to-spy-on-your-car/ [https://perma.cc/5CJC-P9DZ].
5. For a look at the machine learning methods and algorithms behind an ALPR system,
including how to build one from the ground up, see Quang Nguyen, Detect and Recognize
Vehicle’s License Plate with Machine Learning and Python — Part 1: Detection License Plate
with Wpod-Net, MEDIUM (Apr. 11, 2020), https://medium.com/@quangnhatnguyenle/detect-andrecognize-vehicles-license-plate-with-machine-learning-and-python-part-1-detection-795fda47e
922 [https://perma.cc/RRN5-BMGH].
6. Tom Simonite, AI License Plate Readers Are Cheaper—So Drive Carefully, WIRED
(Jan. 27, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/ai-license-plate-readers-cheaper-drivecarefully/ [https://perma.cc/WY5V-SG5R] (describing a new “boost from AI . . . that will make
the [ALPR] device better at reading plates at high speed or in bad weather.”).
7. Rohrlich, supra note 4. But see Green v. City of San Francisco:
(“ALPR”) mistakenly identified Green’s Lexus as a stolen vehicle. Without
visually confirming the license plate, Sergeant Kim made a “high-risk” stop
during which Green was held at gunpoint by multiple officers, handcuffed,
forced to her knees, and detained for up to twenty minutes. She was released only
after officers eventually ran her plate and discovered the ALPR mistake and that
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automatically flag vehicles that appear on a “hotlist,” alerting officers to
stolen cars or abducted children.8 Opponents, however, estimate that as
little as 0.2 percent of scans result in a hit and argue that the remainder
amounts to indiscriminate, suspicionless mass surveillance that can
“violate the rights of entire communities.”9 Indeed, in 2018 the NYPD
settled the last of three years-long lawsuits concerning its surveillance of
Muslim neighborhoods for over one million dollars.10 The NYPD
admitted years ago to having a picture “of every single car that travels in
or out of the city” and the capability to “geo-spatially map each location
in the city where a plate reader has spotted the car in the past five years.”11
But their surveillance expanded to target Muslims, driving unmarked
ALPR-enabled cars past mosques.12 Nationwide, ALPR use jumped from
17% of police departments in 2007 to 71% by 2012,13 and increasingly
cheaper technology in recent years has allowed departments to use even
more cameras.14 In addition to prolific use by police departments,
individual universities are now deploying them on campuses as well.15

her vehicle was not stolen.
751 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 2014). This led to a half-million dollar settlement of a § 1983 suit.
Joshua Sabatini, City Set to Approve Wrongful Arrest Suit Settlement, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER
(Sept. 7, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/city-set-to-approve-wrongfularrest-suit-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/BFP6-J9ND].
8. E.g., Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
https://www.eff.org/pages/automated-license-plate-readers-alpr [https://perma.cc/7QLQ-6DH2]
(last updated Aug. 28, 2017).
9. Id.
10. Matt Katz, NYPD Pays $1 Million, Vows Surveillance Reforms After Settling with
Muslims in New Jersey, WNYC (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.wnyc.org/story/nypd-vowssurveillance-reforms-after-settling-lawsuit-muslims-new-jersey/ [https://perma.cc/DC6T-EE ZV].
11. Chris Francescani, NYPD Expands Surveillance Net to Fight Crime as well as
Terrorism, REUTERS (June 21, 2013, 11:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-nysurveillance/nypd-expands-surveillance-net-to-fight-crime-as-well-as-terrorism-idUSL2N0EV0
D220130621 [https://perma.cc/M4EY-NGTK]. More recently, the state of Maryland captured
over 500 million scans in 2020 alone. Harwell & Timberg, supra note 1.
12. Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Defends Tactics Over Mosque Spying; Records
Reveal New Details On Muslim Surveillance, HUFFPOST (Apr. 25, 2012),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/nypd-defends-tactics-over_n_1298997 [https://perma.cc/J4GZEHZE].
13. Newcombe, supra note 3.
14. Simonite, supra note 6 (detailing how a small-town PD, near this author’s hometown,
is now tapped into several public security cameras because its supplier “charges as little as $50
per month” for each camera).
15. E.g., UCLA Policy 134, UCLA.EDU, http://www.adminpolicies.ucla.edu/APP/Number/
134.0 [https://perma.cc/36B9-4XXH] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022); Traffic Rules and Regulations,
UNIV. S. ALABAMA, https://www.southalabama.edu/departments/parkingservices/rulesandregs
.html [https://perma.cc/9BPD-MJ9S] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022).
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Courts have universally agreed that an isolated scan from an ALPR is
not an unconstitutional search, primarily because it occurs in public.16
But there is a growing theory, dubbed the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth
Amendment, that mass data should be analyzed as a whole to determine
if an invasive search has taken place.17 In April of 2020, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court became the first appellate court to
adopt the mosaic theory in relation to ALPRs and rule that prolonged
ALPR use would constitute a collective Fourth Amendment search.18
This Note demonstrates the legal and practical problems of applying the
mosaic theory to ALPRs. Despite sounding promising on paper, the U.S.
Supreme Court is unlikely to agree with such an application. This Note
proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the legal background of both
ALPRs and the mosaic theory leading up to Commonwealth v. McCarthy.
Part II dissects the flaws in that opinion with respect to the mosaic theory
and ALPRs. Part III further examines the practical limitations of applying
and administering the mosaic theory to ALPRs, while Part IV instead
proposes viable alternatives to limit the growing reach of ALPRs.
I. ALPRS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Individuals facing ALPR evidence in court have alleged Fourth
Amendment violations, often as an unreasonable basis for a traffic stop,
but discrete ALPR use has nearly universally been upheld.19 The usual
reasoning is that a scan occurs in public so there is no unreasonable
search, stemming from the Supreme Court’s holding in New York v.
Class,20 but some courts have found the conclusion so obvious that they
do not include a supporting citation.21 The Eleventh Circuit went out of
its way to affirm ALPR use in a short, unpublished, per curiam opinion22
when it could have ruled on other grounds.23 But in the past decade, a
new theory has emerged to argue against the aggregated use over time of
otherwise-legal technology such as ALPRs, and it has been embraced by
some courts.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 19–23.
17. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313
(2012); see also discussion infra Section I.A.
18. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1095 (Mass. 2020).
19. One exception from 2019 concerned holding the data under a specific state statute,
Virginia’s Data Act. Neal v. Fairfax Cnty. Police Dep’t, 2019 WL 1438078 at *2–4 (Va. Cir.
2019).
20. 475 U.S. 106, 114–15 (1986) (finding no expectation privacy when “[t]he exterior of a
car . . .is thrust into the public eye”).
21. E.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. Cnty. of Monroe, 4 N.Y.S.3d 847, 904 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (“Since
a vehicle either being driven or parked on the street occurs in public, a recorded ‘read’ by a license
plate reader is not an invasion of personal privacy.”).
22. United States v. Wilcox, 415 Fed. Appx. 990, 991 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
23. The defendant did not object in a timely manner. Id. at 992.
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A. The Mosaic Theory
In the 2012 case United States v. Maynard,24 the D.C. Circuit
introduced a new approach to Fourth Amendment searches based on
aggregation, which Professor Orin Kerr has labeled the “mosaic theory”
of the Fourth Amendment and described as “requir[ing] analyzing police
actions over time as a collective ‘mosaic’ of surveillance; the mosaic can
count as a collective Fourth Amendment search even though the
individual steps taken in isolation do not.”25 The analogy is to a mosaic
in that an individual unicolor tile reveals nothing, whereas the entire
mosaic is highly detailed.26 The theory’s appeal is that it seeks to protect
privacy interests against evolving government surveillance technology
when the whole is arguably greater than the sum of its parts.27 Maynard
applied the theory to a four-week period of GPS surveillance of a car and
held that it amounted to an unconstitutional search.28 The Supreme Court
had direct review of Maynard in United States v. Jones,29 and the Court
could have addressed the mosaic theory and confronted 21st century
technology head-on but instead resolved the case with “18th century tort
law” by construing law enforcement’s warrantless placement of the GPS
device on the defendant’s car as a trespass.30
While Jones contained no explicit mention of the mosaic theory,
multiple scholars including Professor Kerr interpreted the two concurring
opinions31 as Supreme Court support of the theory.32 In the years that
followed, several commentators argued that the mosaic theory can and
should be applied against ALPRs to find their use unconstitutional.33
24. Maynard v. United States, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. United States
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
25. Kerr, supra note 17.
26. Paul Rosenzweig, In Defense of the Mosaic Theory, LAWFARE (Nov. 29, 2017, 3:18
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-mosaic-theory [https://perma.cc/V4BT-4QFA].
27. Id.; see also Kerr, supra note 17, at 345.
28. Kerr, supra note 17.
29. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
30. Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
31. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing concerns with a “precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations” and the fact that “the
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is
susceptible to abuse”); id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“asking whether respondent’s
reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring”).
32. E.g., Kerr, supra note 17 (“[C]oncurring opinions signed or joined by five of the justices
endorsed some form of the D.C. Circuit’s mosaic theory.”); Christopher Slobogin, Making the
Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic
Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2012) (same).
33. E.g., Jessica Gutierrez-Alm, Note, The Privacies of Life: Automatic License Plate
Recognition is Unconstitutional Under the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy Law, 38
HAMLINE L. REV. 127 (2015); Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth
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Until two years ago no appellate court had agreed. But in April 2020, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court handed down Commonwealth v.
McCarthy, wherein it embraced the mosaic theory and declared that “the
defendant has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in the
whole of his public movements.”34
B. McCarthy: The Mosaic Theory Applied to ALPRs
Massachusetts’ highest court seized upon a reservation that the
Supreme Court expressed in a 1983 surveillance case, United States v.
Knotts.35 There, the Court upheld the warrantless use of a radio device
police used to track a vehicle on a single journey, holding that “[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another”36 but
noting later that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable.”37 The McCarthy court “indeed [] determined that different
constitutional principles govern” than did in Knotts when it concerns a
network of ALPRs.38
McCarthy fully and expressly endorsed the mosaic theory, finding it
to be “wholly consistent with the statement in Katz that ‘[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection,’ because the whole of one’s movements, even if
they are all individually public, are not knowingly exposed in the
aggregate.”39 The McCarthy court approvingly quoted a passage from the
Maynard opinion and concluded that “the whole reveals far more than
the sum of the parts.”40 After noting that the proper test would be to weigh
all of the data collected by the government on the subject—as opposed to
strictly what it sought to submit into evidence—and how that was “not
possible in the record before [it],” the court nonetheless declared that
“[w]ith enough cameras in enough locations, the historic location data
from an ALPR system in Massachusetts would invade a reasonable
expectation of privacy and would constitute a search for constitutional
Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L. REV.
527, 546 (2017) (“[T]here are arguably heightened Fourth Amendment consequences when it
comes to a network of license plate readers that keep records of cars’ locations over time,
information not readily available to the public.”).
34. 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1095 (Mass. 2020).
35. Id. at 1101 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–85 (1983)).
36. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
37. Id. at 284.
38. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1101. But see discussion infra Section II.A.
39. Id. at 1102–03 (alteration in original) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)).
40. Id.
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purposes.”41 Specifically, the court found that the state’s “one-year
retention period . . . certainly is long enough to warrant constitutional
protection.”42
II. MCCARTHY AND THE FALLACIES OF APPLYING THE MOSAIC
THEORY TO ALPRS
The McCarthy court’s decision to apply the mosaic theory to ALPRs
is flawed in many respects. First, it failed to heed a cautionary statement
by the U.S. Supreme Court that it quoted later in its own opinion, that
“Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not
by extravagant generalizations.”43 This is so because McCarthy
ultimately held that there was no constitutional violation in the case at
bar, because on the meager data on the record—four cameras from the
ends of two bridges—“the limited use of ALPRs in this case [did] not
constitute a search.”44 Therefore, the court’s sweeping pronouncement
that a one-year period of ALPR surveillance with an unspecified number
of cameras would “certainly [be] long enough” to constitute an
unconstitutional search was merely dicta.45 Further, the McCarthy court
erred in arriving at that conclusion in five separate ways: (1) by treating
the mosaic theory as if it had been approved by the Supreme Court; (2)
by treating ALPR data akin to cell-site location information (CSLI); (3)
by finding support for its conclusion in the Supreme Court advanced
technology case Kyllo v. United States;46 (4) by finding a reasonable
expectation of privacy; and (5) by failing to consider the exceptions to
the exclusionary rule. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
A. Misplaced Reliance on the Mosaic Theory
First, the McCarthy court failed to flesh out the “different
constitutional principles” that it claimed governed the case.47 The next
section in the opinion, and nearly its entire justification for how “an
ALPR system in Massachusetts [could] invade a reasonable expectation
of privacy” was both titled and devoted to the mosaic theory, 48 which is
not a constitutional principle, but a theory.49 The Supreme Court had the
41. Id. at 1103–04.
42. Id. at 1104 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 1105 (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986)).
44. Id. at 1106.
45. Id. at 1104.
46. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
47. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1102. It should be noted that a similar pronouncement was “a
proposition the Court was careful not to announce in Jones,” in the words of Justice Kennedy.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2231 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1104.
49. See United States v. Wilford, 961 F. Supp. 2d 740, 772 (D. Md. 2013) (“[T]he mosaic
theory was not adopted as a holding by the Supreme Court.”).
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full opportunity to endorse the D.C. Circuit’s mosaic theory, as Jones was
a direct review of Maynard,50 but as noted by Professor Kerr, the majority
“resolved the case without reaching the mosaic theory, and neither
concurring opinion gave the issue extensive analysis.”51 In fact, the Jones
majority did not cite to Maynard a single time outside of establishing the
procedural history. Nonetheless, the concerns briefly expressed in the
Jones concurrences, despite being dicta, have garnered substantial
academic discussion.52
The McCarthy court wrongly implied that the Supreme Court had
fully adopted the mosaic theory in the Court’s 2018 surveillance case
United States v. Carpenter by using an incomplete line from it as a
parenthetical quote, that “individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the whole of their physical movements.”53 The first half of the
sentence from which that line was excerpted is a critical clarifier: “A
majority of this Court has already recognized that . . .”54 It is an important
distinction that Chief Justice Roberts’ recognition of the previously
expressed views of his colleagues from non-binding opinions55 did not
suddenly place an official stamp of approval on the mosaic theory and
turn it into binding precedent.56 There are many ways to phrase that
sentence, and he easily could have given credence to the mosaic theory
by discussing it in a Supreme Court majority opinion for the first time,
but instead he confined the reference to a bare factual recitation. Indeed,
the closest the mosaic theory came to being named in Carpenter—despite
Carpenter’s going “all-in” on the theory in his brief57—is in the title of
one of a dozen sources in a single footnote in Justice Thomas’ dissent,
sources that he collectively cited as criticism for the Katz test of
reasonableness.58 The immense difficulties that courts would have in
administering a mosaic theory-based test if the theory was adopted (along
with other reasons why it should not be) will be discussed in Part III.

50. Maynard v. United States, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. United States
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
51. Kerr, supra note 17.
52. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 32–33.
53. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1101 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206,
2217 (2018)).
54. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment), 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
55. He cited directly to both Jones concurrences, which should clarify the point.
56. Other courts have also used the same partial quote from Carpenter to imply that it stands
for more than it does. E.g., United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851, 862 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bea, C.J.,
concurring in judgment).
57. Orin Kerr, Four Thoughts on the Briefing in Carpenter v. United States, LAWFARE (Nov.
17, 2017, 3:06 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/four-thoughts-briefing-carpenter-v-unitedstates [https://perma.cc/N65J-5EJX].
58. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2244 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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B. Flawed Analogy to Cell Phone Location Data
The McCarthy court also failed to distinguish the private nature of the
cell-site location information (CSLI) of Carpenter from ALPR data. As
noted in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, “[c]ell phones continuously scan
their environment . . . several times per minute”59 and “faithfully follow[]
beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices,
political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”60 ALPRs
do not follow people into residences or offices; they are purely public,
and most, like the ones in McCarthy, are stationary, so they do not
provide the precise granular data of GPS monitoring. A scan from an
ALPR at a particular cross-street does not let someone conclude that the
driver was on the sort of private trip that concerned Justice Sotomayor in
Jones, “to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the
AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the
by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church,
the gay bar and on and on.”61 ALPRs only periodically record a car’s
location in public; its owner’s movements are an inference. In a 2020
ALPR case in the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Yang, the defendant was
“unlucky” that the single available read of the car he had rented, of the 5
billion scans in the system, occurred “when he was in possession of the
vehicle and was made near his residence,” allowing an officer to locate
him.62 Judge Bea, in his concurrence, noted that this was a far cry from
the 13,000 data points that were collected in Carpenter and fell well short
of revealing “particular movements”63 or the “familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations” that concerned Justice
Sotomayor in Jones.64 Additionally, a passenger in a vehicle enjoys
complete anonymity from ALPRs, as does anyone utilizing any other
form of transportation, so a person can conceal their movements from
ALPRs if they so desire much easier than they can from facial
recognition, for example.65
The Court in Carpenter quoted from additional cases to explicitly
contrast cell phones and cars. The Court observed that “unlike the . . . car
in Jones, a cell phone—almost a ‘feature of human anatomy’—tracks
59. Id. at 2211 (majority opinion).
60. Id. at 2218.
61. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
62. United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851, 862 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bea, C.J., concurring in
judgment).
63. Id. (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217).
64. Id. (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217).
65. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citations omitted) (“What a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”).
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nearly exactly the movements of its owner”66 and also quoted
approvingly from Caldwell v. Lewis that “[a] car has little capacity for
escaping public scrutiny.”67 Despite this distinction and the conclusion
that “historical cell-site records present even greater privacy concerns
than [Jones’s] GPS monitoring,”68 it was still a close question for the
Court, as Carpenter was decided 5-4.69 Given that ALPRs
unquestionably present lesser privacy concerns than GPS monitoring or
CSLI,70 the McCarthy court took an unwarranted leap from the Carpenter
court’s passing mention of a reasonable expectation of privacy in “the
whole of [one’s] physical movements” to the conclusion that McCarthy
had such an expectation in the entirety of his public movements alone.71
The critical distinction between CSLI in private areas and ALPR data
from public areas survives the omnipresence of ALPRs and the use of AI.
This conclusion draws from two unbroken lines of Supreme Court cases,
both of which the McCarthy court acknowledged but misapplied—the
first regarding observation of automobiles, the second dealing with
advancing technology used by law enforcement. The frequently cited
Supreme Court support for ALPR use comes from New York v. Class,
which the McCarthy court properly quoted in its opinion: “The exterior
of a car, of course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it
does not constitute a ‘search.’”72 The McCarthy court traced Class to a
“what is knowingly exposed” principle first espoused in Katz v. United
States73 and found further support in Knotts as well as a 2002
Massachusetts appellate case.74 The McCarthy court then veered away
from this foundation to embrace the mosaic theory, quoting at length from
66. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014))
(cleaned up).
67. Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
68. Id.
69. Four members of the Carpenter majority and three dissenters make up the current Court,
and Justice Kavanaugh voted against Jones at the circuit level. United States v. Jones, 656 F.3d
766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010). It should also be noted that there was an additional factor in Carpenter,
not present with ALPR, that cut against privacy, which is that the government sought the CSLI
from a third party, the cell service provider. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
70. The McCarthy court even admitted that “no ALPR network is likely to be as detailed in
its surveillance as GPS or CSLI data.” Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1104
(Mass. 2020); see also id. at 1102 (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218) (noting how CSLI
“achieves ‘near perfect surveillance’”).
71. Id. (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217). When Carpenter was remanded, the Sixth
Circuit stated: “Key to the Court’s reasoning was the inability of CSLI to distinguish between
public and private life.” United States vs Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 316 (6th Cir. 2019).
72. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1101 (Mass. 2020) (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,
114 (1986)); see also cases cited supra notes 19–23, infra notes 98–99, and accompanying text.
73. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
74. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1101 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983)
and Commonwealth v. Starr, 773 N.E.2d 981, 984–85 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)).
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Maynard,75 even though the Supreme Court did not explicitly endorse the
Maynard opinion or the mosaic theory, despite having the full
opportunity to do so.76 The McCarthy court provided only the above
partial quote from Carpenter77 as support for its assertion that “the United
States Supreme Court [has] recognized a privacy interest in the whole of
one’s public movements,”78 but if it had also analyzed an additional
Supreme Court case that followed Knotts the next year, that should have
led the McCarthy court away from its conclusion.
In 1984, the Court narrowed the holding of Knotts in United States v.
Karo.79 After Knotts upheld the warrantless use of a radio beeper to track
a car on a public highway, the government sought to admit evidence
based on another beeper, similarly placed in a container of chemicals, that
was carried into a house, wherein the government was able to verify that
it remained hours later.80 The Court struck down the new use,
distinguishing Knotts because the new information came from “a private
residence, a location not open to visual surveillance.”81 The Court
reasoned that the information in question in Knotts was “voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look,”82 whereas in Karo, “the
monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that
could not have been visually verified.”83
As noted above, McCarthy seized upon the reservation in Knotts,84
but it did so without ever discussing Karo, which would have revealed
the distinction between public and private. While the oft-quoted line from
Katz is that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”85
Justice Harlan, in the lead-in of his famous concurrence, noted that
determining “what protection it affords to those people [generally]
requires reference to a ‘place.’”86 This has led to the critical phrase
“constitutionally protected area” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.87
In United States v. Graham, the District Court of Maryland, ruling on
CSLI before Carpenter but after Jones, after discussing Karo found it of
75. Id. at 1103.
76. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
78. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1103.
79. 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984).
80. Id. at 714.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 715 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
83. Id.
84. See discussion supra Section I.B.
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
86. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. E.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (citations omitted) (“[A]n open
field, unlike the curtilage of a home, is not one of those protected areas enumerated in the Fourth
Amendment.”).
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critical importance that in Graham “[d]efendants ha[d] not argued that
the historical cell site records revealed their movements in protected areas
such as their homes.”88 Carpenter itself, in Chief Justice Roberts’ own
words, was “about a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence
compiled every day, every moment.”89 Before arriving at this conclusion,
Chief Justice Roberts quoted from the concerns in Knotts about “twentyfour hour surveillance” earlier in the opinion.90 ALPRs do not chronicle
every moment, twenty-four hours per day, and they do not intrude on any
constitutionally protected areas. The two aforementioned ALPR cases
from 2020 evidence this—over multiple months, McCarthy was scanned
only on a single bridge,91 while Yang’s rental car registered just once in
over a week.92
Karo dovetails with the second line of cases that McCarthy
misapplied, concerning the use of advancing technology by law
enforcement.93 The McCarthy court set the tone early on for its
conclusions by quoting from its own recent case that “both this court and
the United States Supreme Court have been careful to guard against the
‘power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy’ by
emphasizing that privacy rights ‘cannot be left at the mercy of advancing
technology but rather must be preserved and protected [from] new
technologies’”94 of the government. As Supreme Court support for this
assertion, the McCarthy opinion cited to the 2001 case of Kyllo v. United
States, without providing any detail.95
C. Inappropriate Reliance on Kyllo
Kyllo is instructive and did anticipate advancing technology, but when
read fairly, it instead provides support for ALPR use and cuts against the
McCarthy court’s conclusions. There, the Court struck down federal
agents’ use of thermal imaging performed from a public street but
directed into the defendant’s house, which the agents used to show that
he was growing marijuana inside.96 The Court held that “[w]here, as here,
the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
88. 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 404 (D. Md. 2012).
89. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
90. Id. at 2215 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983)).
91. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1104–05 (Mass. 2020).
92. United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2020).
93. See Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 404 (“[Knotts and Karo] stand for the proposition that
law enforcement conducts a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ when it utilizes tracking technology that
allows surveillance in locations that police could not monitor in the absence of that technology.”).
94. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1098 (quoting Commonwealth v. Almonor, 120 N.E.3d 1183,
1191 (2019)).
95. Id. (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
96. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
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physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.”97 The Government sought to rely on
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, a case involving aerial visual
surveillance that, the Kyllo court acknowledged, held “that visual
observation is no ‘search’ at all.”98 The Kyllo court noted that visual
surveillance was largely unquestioned dating back to English common
law and recognized Dow Chemical when it stated that “technology
enabling human flight has exposed to public view (and hence, we have
said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the house,”99 but it
held that thermal imaging was a bridge too far in that it was much more
than a force-multiplier because thermal information “would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”100
Parsing the holding of Kyllo, its conclusion, shows how it contradicts
McCarthy’s reasoning regarding ALPRs at each of three turns: (1) “not
in general public use;” (2) “details of the home;” and (3) “previously
unknowable without physical intrusion.”101 First, ALPR technology is
readily available to the public, starting in 2015, free software could turn
any internet-connected camera into an ALPR.102 For example, the
technology is becoming popular with the likes of homeowners
associations103 and property managers.104 The “general public use” test
has been criticized as a “loophole” that is difficult to administer.105
However, it necessarily looked to the future,106 and further, “[t]he
97. Id. at 40.
98. Id. at 32 (citing Dow Chem., 476 U.S. 227, 234–35 (1986)).
99. Id. at 34.
100. Id. at 40; cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (reasoning that the radio
technology “merely augmented officers’ physical abilities and did not provide more information
than officers could have obtained by visual surveillance”).
101. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
102. Cyrus Farivar, New Software Watches for License Plates, Turning You into Little
Brother, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 5, 2015, 12:30 PM), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2015/12/new-open-source-license-plate-reader-software-lets-you-make-your-ownhot-list/ [https://perma.cc/RET3-4LUN]; see also Rohrlich, supra note 4.
103. Ella Fassler, Neighborhood Watch Has a New Tool: Privately Owned License-Plate
Readers, MEDIUM: ONEZERO (Nov. 12, 2020), https://onezero.medium.com/neighborhood-watchhas-a-new-tool-privately-owned-license-plate-readers-302f296abb27 [https://perma.cc/MY4WNXLH].
104. Josh Kaplan, License Plate Readers Are Creeping into Neighborhoods Across the
Country, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (July 10, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/
07/automatic-license-plate-readers-hoa-police-openalpr.html [https://perma.cc/35W9-5JQY].
105. Mike Petridis, In General Public Use: An Unnecessary Test to Determine Whether the
Use of Advanced Sensing Technology Was a Fourth Amendment Search, TOURO L. REV. BLOG
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://tourolawreviewblog.wordpress.com/2020/04/21/in-general-public-use-an
-unnecessary-test-to-determine-whether-the-use-of-advanced-sensing-technology-was-a-fourthamendment-search/ [https://perma.cc/WX2J-R7RJ].
106. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 (“[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.”).
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touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” harkening back
to the expectation of privacy test of Katz.107 After all, if it was
commonplace for people of the 1960’s to carry around parabolic
microphones, it would not have been reasonable for Mr. Katz to expect
privacy in his famous phonebooth.108
Secondly, the Kyllo opinion afforded strong protection to the
residence, noting in its very first sentence that the surveillance was
gathered from a private home.109 The Court stated that “‘[a]t the very
core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion’”110 and declared that “[w]ith few exceptions, the question
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence
constitutional must be answered no.”111 There are no such heightened
concerns in the case of ALPRs stationed in public, making their use akin
to the enhanced aerial photography of Dow Chemical, where the Court
found, as noted by the Kyllo court, “it important that this is not an area
immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are
most heightened.”112 This remains true even if the car was parked in a
driveway or an open garage.113
Lastly, the Kyllo court placed a significant distinction on the fact that
the thermal imaging “would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion.”114 The Court reasoned that finding a search on those
grounds “assures preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”115
The entire purpose of a license plate is to make the vehicle identifiable to
law enforcement, and thus as noted by the Class court decades ago, “it is
unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in an object required by
law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from the exterior of
the automobile.”116 The McCarthy court, however, incorrectly placed
107. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also sources cited supra note 58.
108. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (majority opinion).
109. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
110. Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
111. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court later observed that the inside of a
home is “the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy.” Id. at
34.
112. Id. at 33 (emphasis in original) (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
237 n.4 (1986)).
113. See id. at 32 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers
to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”).
114. Id. at 40.
115. Id. at 34.
116. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986). Many states retain ownership of the plate,
further removing any privacy interest. E.g., License Plates & Registration, FLA. HIGHWAY
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ALPR use in the “previously unknowable” category with CSLI, stating
that “[l]ike CSLI data, ALPRs allow the police to reconstruct people’s
past movements . . . thus granting police access to ‘a category of
information otherwise unknowable.’”117 The McCarthy court also
emphasized, from its own past case, that “the government, without
securing a warrant, may use electronic devices to monitor an individual’s
movements in public to the extent that the same result could be achieved
through visual surveillance.”118 Curiously, McCarthy used this precedent
to argue against ALPR use, when it should have pointed to upholding the
use.
Here, the McCarthy court failed to recognize the force-multiplier
nature of an ALPR network.119 It admitted that “an officer may read or
write down a publicly displayed license plate number. In this way, a
single license plate reader is similar to traditional [allowable] surveillance
techniques,” but then listed four factors that it considered distinguishing:
retention, recording nearly every vehicle, its ongoing nature, and the
inclusion of a location.120 The first and final factors can be easily disposed
of, as a single police officer can readily write down a car’s location and
retain it.121 The middle two factors also distinguish ALPRs from CSLI,
because a finite number of officers working in shifts could duplicate the
work of a finite number of ALPRs in public spaces, whereas no number
of officers could produce the comprehensive record of CSLI.122
Therefore, an ALPR network should be allowable because it “merely
augment[s] officers’ physical abilities” as in Knotts,123 and at all times, it
SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.flhsmv.gov/motor-vehicles-tags-titles/license-platesregistration/ [https://perma.cc/98CU-4MEA] (last visited Jan. 7, 2022) (“please remember license
plates belong to the state [of Florida]”); see also The Question of License Plates, U.S. VEHICLE
REGISTRATION SERV. (July 24, 2020), https://www.usvrs.com/blog/the-question-of-license-plates/
[https://perma.cc/JTM8-DVJU] (listing the roughly one-third of states that require the return of
license plates).
117. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1104 (Mass. 2020) (quoting Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018)).
118. Id. at 1102 (emphasis in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846,
863–64 (Mass. 2014)).
119. See cases cited supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Jeff Weiner, UCF
Scanning License Plates of Cars on Campus to Check Against Police Databases, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (June 20, 2019, 4:09 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/crime/os-ne-ucflicense-plate-scanners-on-campus-parking-20190620-pop76kgusbfrdaw6iz2our2rmm-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9PGQ-EFDC] (university police chief calling its new ALPR network a “force
multiplier”).
120. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1106.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (“A police car following
[the driver] at a distance could have observed him.”).
122. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“GPS is not a mere
enhancement of human sensory capacity, it facilitates a new technological perception of the
world.”).
123. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
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constitutes solely “visual observation [which] is no ‘search’ at all.”124 For
all these reasons, Kyllo fully supports the use of ALPRs.
D. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
While concurring opinions from Jones cited to Kyllo in expressing
their concerns with aggregated data,125 those concerns should be allayed
when it comes to ALPRs. Such searches are always made in public and
are consistent with a reasonable expectation of privacy, which remains
the heart of Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence.126 As described in
2018 in Carpenter, ever since Katz v. United States,127 “[w]hen an
individual ‘seeks to preserve something as private,’ and his expectation
of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ we
have held that official intrusion into that private sphere generally qualifies
as a search.”128 In Jones, Justices Sotomayor and Alito, speaking for five
justices between them, both indicated that they would have resolved the
case with the reasonable expectation of privacy test.129 The mosaic
theory, not explicitly mentioned in any portion of Jones, would be a
means to that end. Even those that argue for the adoption of the mosaic
theory to strike down ALPR use must concede that ALPRs are
significantly less invasive than GPS monitoring,130 which involves
“constant, uninterrupted monitoring”131 even into private areas of the sort
that concerned Justice Sotomayor in Jones.132 Cameras are also more
expected—drivers have long been aware that there are cameras on traffic
lights (“red-light cameras”) and toll booths, for example, to accompany
police officers.133 Given that most medium-sized American police
departments have ALPRs,134 most regular drivers have experienced
124. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (citation omitted).
125. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 420
(Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
126. This includes the starting point for McCarthy’s discussion section, for example.
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1097 (Mass. 2020).
127. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
128. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2208, 2213 (2018) (quoting Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
129. Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would ask whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated.”); id. at 419 (Alito, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“I would analyze the question presented in this case by asking whether
respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring.”).
130. This includes the McCarthy court. See supra note 70.
131. Gutierrez-Alm, supra note 33, at 151–52; see also supra note 70 and accompanying
text.
132. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
133. As the McCarthy court acknowledged, “[i]t is an entirely ordinary experience to drive
past a police officer in a cruiser observing traffic.” Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d
1090, 1106 (Mass. 2020) (citation omitted).
134. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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ALPR surveillance and should therefore expect it.135 In McCarthy, “a
testifying expert alluded to cameras ‘all over the State,’”136 and amici
submitted that there were over 150 cameras five years before.137
Massachusetts drivers, like McCarthy, had plenty of notice of the
existence of the cameras in the state certainly by the time the Boston
Globe, among others, reported on the Boston Police Department’s halting
of its ALPR system in 2013 after public records requests revealed that the
department was not following its own policies and not properly protecting
the data.138
The Court has found a reasonable expectation of privacy to be lacking
based on much more infrequent occurrences. In California v. Ciraolo,
officers responding to an anonymous tip “secured a private plane and
flew over respondent’s house at an altitude of 1,000 feet,” and from that
vantage point they could identify marijuana growing in the defendant’s
backyard,139 at least with the aid of a standard 35mm camera. 140 The
defendant clearly manifested a subjective expectation of privacy by
erecting a 10-foot inner fence,141 but the Court reasoned that “[a]ny
member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could
have seen everything that [those] officers observed” and therefore
“readily conclude[d] that respondent’s expectation that his garden was
protected from such observation is unreasonable.”142 In a point applicable
to ALPRs, the Court’s majority opinion countered a contention by the
dissent by stating that “Justice Harlan’s observations about future
electronic developments and the potential for electronic interference with
private communications were plainly not aimed at simple visual
observations from a public place.”143
135. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“ask[ing] whether the
use of GPS tracking . . . involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have
anticipated”). But see Gutierrez-Alm, supra note 33, at 152 (arguing for the use of Professor
Kerr’s probabilistic model to overcome this when it comes to aggregation).
136. 142 N.E.3d at 1105.
137. Id. at n.14.
138. Shawn Musgrave, Boston Police Halt License Plate Scanning Program, BOSTON GLOBE
(Dec. 14, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/12/14/boston-police-suspend-usehigh-tech-licence-plate-readers-amid-privacy-concerns/B2hy9UIzC7KzebnGyQ0JNM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/6HPK-M34X]. The program resumed in 2018. Shawn Musgrave, Boston Police
Resume Using License Plate Readers After Accidental Release of Data, BOSTON GLOBE (May
6, 2018), http://www0.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/05/06/boston-police-resume-using-licenseplate-readers-after-accidental-release-data/gZrC8ozxad9GxcymIxtLfO/story.html [https://perma
.cc/8687-AZJ5].
139. 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
140. Id.; see also discussion supra Section II.C.
141. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
142. Id. at 213–14.
143. Id. at 214 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
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Three years later, the Court considered a similar case, this time
involving a helicopter, in Florida v. Riley.144 Officers again observed
marijuana in a backyard after responding to an anonymous tip, this time
from a helicopter at a height of 400 feet, lower than what is allowed by
fixed-wing aircraft like those at issue in Ciraolo.145 But since helicopters
are allowed at that height, the Court reasoned that “[a]ny member of the
public could legally have been flying over Riley’s property,” and it set
the threshold frequency of such an occurrence quite low, observing that
“there is no indication that such flights are unheard of” in the region.146
ALPR systems are far from unheard of, as most medium-sized police
departments in the country utilize them,147 and many agencies that
employ such a system give full public notice of its use, often
accompanied by newspaper articles.148
Even if a court finds a search in a particular case, there is an additional
step, as the Fourth Amendment protects only against “unreasonable
searches.”149 The argument for a reasonable search was not considered in
Jones because it was not raised below and thus forfeited,150 but the
analysis in a subsequent car GPS tracking case from the Court of Appeals
of New York is revealing. In Cunningham v. New York State Department
of Labor, a New York state employer suspected an employee of falsifying
time sheets, so it attached a GPS to his car.151 Relying on Jones and
Weaver,152 New York’s highest court found that this constituted a search,
but it then considered whether the search was reasonable given the
suspicions that the employer had.153 The court held that the twenty-fourhour monitoring, including Cunningham’s vacation, was unreasonable,
but it strongly suggested that if the scope of the monitoring had been
limited to business hours, the search would have been reasonable.154
Applying this rationale to ALPRs, monitoring occurs only when people
are actively out on public roads, and then only intermittently,155 so any
144. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
145. Id. at 449–51 (plurality opinion) (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215).
146. Id. at 450–51 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, agreed that “the
reasonableness of Riley’s expectation depends, in large measure, on the frequency of nonpolice
helicopter flights at an altitude of 400 feet.” Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 15, 119.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
150. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012).
151. 21 N.Y.3d 515, 518 (2013).
152. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009); see supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
153. Cunningham, 21 N.Y.3d at 522.
154. Id. at 523 (“Where an employer conducts a GPS search without making a reasonable
effort to avoid tracking an employee outside of business hours, the search . . . must be considered
unreasonable.”).
155. See text accompanying supra notes 91–92.
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search that could be found by a court should still be reasonable and thus
allowable.
E. Failure to Consider Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
Lastly, the McCarthy court was too quick to apply the mosaic theory
given the case’s procedural posture. ALPR validity was at issue due to a
motion to suppress the ALPR evidence.156 ALPR use is commonly
challenged directly at that stage, or similarly as an improper basis for a
warrant.157 In either scenario, the exclusionary rule is a doctrine that
courts can apply to block the government from entering evidence that was
obtained in violation of the Constitution.158 However, in Stone v. Powell,
the Supreme Court stated that the exclusionary rule “is not a personal
constitutional right,” as its “primary justification . . . is the deterrence of
police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.”159 The Court
reasoned that “this concern has limited force as a justification for the
exclusion of highly probative evidence.”160 The ability to place a subject
at the scene of a crime via an ALPR is, of course, highly probative
evidence. Furthermore, there is Supreme Court precedent that on such a
motion to suppress on grounds of an unconstitutional privacy intrusion,
the burden lies with the defendant.161 McCarthy’s counsel admitted that
he “possesse[d] the burden to show that he” met both the subjective and
objective elements of the Katz test.162 Therefore, any doubt about
allowing such evidence should have been resolved in favor of the
prosecution.163 Two exceptions to the exclusionary rule further
demonstrate how McCarthy’s rationale is untenable.
First, the good faith exception164should have applied to the officers in
McCarthy had the court ruled that there was a search. That exception
serves to admit evidence gathered by officers who were operating on the
objectively reasonable and good faith belief that they had the proper legal
156. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1095 (Mass. 2020).
157. E.g., United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2020).
158. Exclusionary Rule, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exclusionary
_rule [https://perma.cc/5MDP-5TNC] (last visited Jan. 7, 2022).
159. 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
160. Id. at 485; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The
[exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.”).
161. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (“Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper
to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing
relevant evidence . . . if the allegation be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim
of an invasion of privacy.”).
162. Br. for Defendant-Appellant, 2019 WL 3996632, at *19.
163. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 148 (2009) (“[T]he deterrent effect of
suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system.”).
164. See generally Good Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/good_faith_exception_to_exclusionary_rule [https://perma.cc/
FJ5Z-9339] (last visited Jan. 8, 2022).
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authority.165 Given that McCarthy was the first appellate state court to
rule that ALPR use could be unconstitutional, naturally the officers were
operating on the understanding that the use of the cameras in question,
installed two years prior to the events of the case166 and controlled by
state regulations,167 was constitutional. Indeed, for background, the
McCarthy court cited a prior Massachusetts appellate case for its holding
“that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy that would
prevent an officer from examining his license plate.”168 It follows that the
good faith exception should have applied if there was a search, as the
officers’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of existing
precedent. However, the McCarthy court did not address this argument,
after the district attorney did not raise it in his brief.169
In United States v. Graham, the government did raise the good faith
exception to backstop its argument concerning the admission of CSLI
data.170 The 2012 case came before Carpenter but after Jones, and while
the District Court of Maryland found no constitutional violation in the
collection of the CSLI, it nonetheless analyzed the exception under the
heading “Suppression Would Not Be The Remedy.”171 There, the officers
acted in reliance on the Stored Communications Act and Magistrate
Judge orders that issued under it, and the court found that this was
objectively reasonable.172 The court concluded, perhaps anticipating
Carpenter, that “[e]ven if the government’s acquisition of historical cell
site location records in this case had been in violation of the Defendants’
Fourth Amendment rights, it obtained those records in good faith
reliance,” and it denied the motion to suppress.173 Similarly, Mr.
Carpenter’s Supreme Court victory was short-lived, as his conviction was
affirmed in 2019 on remand to the Sixth Circuit, which applied the good
faith exception.174 The officers in McCarthy should have been afforded
similar protection if that was necessary.
The mechanics of the good faith exception show how McCarthy has
only muddied the water for future cases in this area. In Davis v. United
165. Id. (“In Davis v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the exclusionary rule does not
apply when the police conduct a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent allowing the
search.”).
166. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1095–96.
167. Id. at 1096.
168. Id. at 1101 (citing Commonwealth v. Starr, 773 N.E.2d 981, 984–85 (Mass. App. Ct.
2002)).
169. See Appellee’s Br., 2019 WL 4134166; cf. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla.
2014) (ruling that the good faith exception did not apply).
170. 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 405 (D. Md. 2012).
171. Id. at 405–06.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 406.
174. United States vs Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 314 (6th Cir. 2019).
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States, the Supreme Court held that “searches conducted in objectively
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the
exclusionary rule.”175 The McCarthy court’s pronouncement that
constitutional protection would “certainly” be warranted prior to hitting
the state’s one-year retention period176 was dicta, meaning that it did not
establish new binding appellate precedent that would serve as official
notice to officers and limit the use of the good-faith exception. Far from
developing a bright-light rule, McCarthy failed to suggest any kind of test
for when, in between the six weeks at bar and the state’s one-year
retention period, the constitutional line would be crossed.177 Thus, it did
not provide guidance for law enforcement to regulate its action, missing
the mark of Stone and parking itself on a very slippery slope. Since
McCarthy did not disturb the prior holding concerning isolated license
plate readings,178 instead applying the mosaic theory to aggregated data,
Massachusetts law enforcement should still be able to use the lack of a
clearly established precedent179 to rely on the good-faith exception in the
next case with similar facts. Further, it would arguably apply each time
that a court wanted to lower the threshold.
A second exception to the exclusionary rule demonstrates another
flaw in the mosaic theory as applied to ALPRs. Under the Independent
Source Doctrine, evidence obtained from an unlawful search may later be
admissible if it is obtained through a separate, constitutional search.180
This doctrine was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams
under the rationale that the police should be put “in the same, not a worse,
position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had
occurred.”181 Thus, if the local police in McCarthy had asked a
homeowners association or property manager near the bridge if they
could help with crime detection by turning over their ALPR data,182 any
information they obtained in this manner would be freely admissible in
court.183 In fact, some such private entities already voluntarily share their
175. 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011).
176. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1104.
177. The court admitted as much when it said that “we cannot say precisely how detailed a
picture of the defendant’s movements must be revealed to invoke constitutional protections.” Id.
at 1106.
178. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
179. For similar rationale concerning qualified immunity, see, e.g., Karen M. Blum, The
Qualified Immunity Defense: What’s “Clearly Established” and What’s Not, 24 TUORO L. REV.
4 (2014).
180. Exclusionary Rule, supra note 158.
181. 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
182. See sources cited supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
183. But see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001)) (“I do not regard as dispositive the fact
that the government might obtain the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional
surveillance techniques.”).
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data with law enforcement.184 Furthermore, if instead the Massachusetts
State Police had monitored McCarthy for a full year state-wide,
assembling an unconstitutionally large dataset in the eyes of the
McCarthy court, they apparently could have turned to the local
Barnstable police who actually accumulated the allowable (and relevant)
data over two-plus months.185 The McCarthy opinion fails to grapple with
these practical intricacies.186
III. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE MOSAIC THEORY
Only the mosaic theory could defeat ALPR use when each individual
piece of information is legitimate on its own.187 Even numbers added
together can only produce even numbers, no matter how many, but the
McCarthy court essentially reasoned that at some point, the sum becomes
odd.188 In addition to the specific flaws in the McCarthy opinion, courts
and scholars have identified additional practical limitations of applying
such an aggregation theory generally. Such criticisms also counsel
against application of the mosaic theory to ALPRs. Several courts have
considered the mosaic theory in Fourth Amendment search cases and
found “that approach to be problematic.”189 The criticisms from courts
and academics can largely be divided into three categories: (1) creating
retroactive unconstitutionality; (2) forcing arbitrary line-drawing by
courts; and (3) making unworkable guidelines for law enforcement.
A. Retroactive Unconstitutionality
The Graham court noted that the Supreme Court’s majority opinion
in Jones did not approve of the D.C. Circuit’s mosaic theory, and Graham
instead agreed with Professor Kerr’s objection to “the bizarre

184. Fassler, supra note 103.
185. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d at 1104–06; see also discussion infra Section III.B.
186. Law enforcement in a state with an ALPR statute (which Massachusetts is not, see infra
note 217) may have additional protection under Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987). See
Kerr, supra note 17, at 341–42; United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 384, 405–06 (D. Md.
2012); United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 317–18 (6th Cir. 2019).
187. See Gutierrez-Alm, supra note 33, at 152–55 (recognizing established precedent of a
lack of an expectation of privacy in public, noting that the mosaic theory “must be employed in
the consideration of ALPR data in order to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy,” and
arguing that it should be adopted).
188. See United States v. Jones, 656 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting) (“The sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero.”). It should be noted
that Justice Kavanaugh joined that opinion. For the opposing view, see Rosenzweig, supra note
26 (“with enough data 1+1+1 really does equal 17”).
189. Graham, 846 F. Supp. at 401; accord State v. Muhammad, 451 P.3d 1060, 1072–73
(Wash. 2019) (discussing “practical problems inherent in this [mosaic] theory”); see also infra
notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
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consequence of creating retroactive unconstitutionality.”190 Retroactive
unconstitutionality is illustrated by an extension of McCarthy, which held
that four cameras over two months did not create an unconstitutional
search but stated that a one-year period would.191 Therefore, if the police
had monitored McCarthy for an additional ten months after obtaining
reasonable suspicion (perhaps in pursuit of a proverbial bigger fish) but
sought to enter into evidence only the initial period, the McCarthy court
would apparently have ruled that the entire “mosaic” was an
unconstitutional search,192 including the relevant period that they
actually held was allowable. As summed up by the Graham court, “the
law as it now stands simply does not contemplate a situation whereby
traditional surveillance becomes a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ only after
some specified period of time—discrete acts of law enforcement are
either constitutional or they are not.”193
B. Arbitrary Line-Drawing
In applying the mosaic theory, even without considering retroactive
unconstitutionality, courts would still need to determine, based on the
facts of each case, whether the imaginary line of unconstitutionality was
crossed. Opinions such as Maynard and McCarthy confidently state that
an intrusion did occur (or could, respectively), but neither lays out any
rules or methods for evaluating closer cases. This is a common thread, as
the mosaic theory is much easier to appeal to than it is to flesh out and
apply. As Professor Kerr, who has followed and debated the mosaic
theory since its first connection to the Fourth Amendment,194 wrote
during the Carpenter proceedings, “one of the fascinating aspects of the
mosaic theory is that its proponents generally go to great lengths to avoid
explaining how they would implement it.”195 The reason for this, he feels,
is that to fully implement it, it would be necessary “to make a few dozen
essentially arbitrary line-drawing calls.”196
190. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (citing Orin S. Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic
Theory” of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuitintroduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendmentsearch/ [https://perma.cc/9EUB-FSXV]).
191. Albeit perhaps with more cameras. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090,
1104 (Mass. 2020) (“With enough cameras in enough locations . . .”).
192. See Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 402 (quoting Kerr, supra note 190) (“that first day of
monitoring eventually and retroactively becomes unconstitutional. It becomes part of the mosaic,
and the key point of Maynard is that the entire mosaic is considered one entity.”).
193. Id. at 401. Granted, Graham was decided before Carpenter—but see text accompanying
supra notes 133–34.
194. See Kerr, supra note 17; Kerr, supra note 121; Kerr, supra note 190.
195. Kerr, supra note 57.
196. Id.
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Proponents of the mosaic theory may point out that there is no brightline rule regarding the allowable duration of a Terry stop, for example,
but there are far fewer factors at play there.197 To evaluate an ALPR
dataset on a particular defendant would require considering: the available
history of the database, the number of cameras that recorded the suspect,
the number of cameras that did not record the suspect, the number of
distinct locations, the number of trips in a limited amount of time such
that one could reasonably infer that the vehicle went directly from point
A to point B, the times of day, etc. The Supreme Court has emphasized
how it “repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts,
police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth
Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual
circumstances.”198 A concern the Court has expressed is that such an
approach “also creates a danger that constitutional rights will be
arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.”199
Furthermore, since ALPRs do not directly track people, only their
vehicles, any bright-line rule is subject to manipulation. A criminal who
suspects that an ALPR camera placed him near the scene of a crime could
intentionally keep driving his car past various ALPRs to try to accumulate
the threshold number of scans before evidence was finalized for trial. And
if a court was to articulate exactly where it was drawing the lines, it would
“quickly become[] clear that you’re really drafting a statute.”200
C. Failing to Balance the Needs of Law Enforcement
The fact that the McCarthy court was not able to illustrate when or
where that line might be crossed, even ex post with the benefit of
hindsight, illustrates how difficult it would be for law enforcement to
determine ex ante when a warrant would be required.201 In the 2014 case
of Tracey v. State, Florida’s Supreme Court squarely considered the
mosaic theory in the context of CSLI and found it to be “not a workable
analysis” for similar reasons.202 The Tracey court found that applying it
would “require[] case-by-case, after-the-fact, ad hoc determinations
whether the length of the monitoring crossed the threshold . . . The [U.S.]

197. See id.; see generally Terry Stop and Frisk: Doctrine and Practice, CONSTITUTION
ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt4_4_4_1_1/ [https://perma.cc/
3VDP-346Z] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022).
198. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (collecting cases).
199. Id. at 181–82 (citation omitted).
200. Kerr, supra note 57; see also discussion infra Section IV.A.
201. See Orin S. Kerr, Automated License Plate Readers, the Mosaic Theory, and the Fourth
Amendment, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 22, 2020, 5:46 AM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2020/04/22/automated-license-plate-readers-the-mosaic-theory-andthe-fourth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/SLJ3-VXYR].
202. 152 So. 3d 504, 520 (Fla. 2014).

2021]

THE NEW MCCARTHYISM

25

Supreme Court has warned against such an ad hoc analysis.”203 The court,
citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, reasoned that privacy concerns
must be balanced with the needs of law enforcement to create “workable
rules.”204 The Tracey court also acknowledged the concurrences in Jones
but recognized that they were dicta and, therefore, “the concerns and
questions raised by the concurring Justices were not answered.”205 Tracey
was decided years before Carpenter, but both holdings agreed that
acquiring CSLI was a search, without resorting to the mosaic theory.206
Some believe that Carpenter’s ruling against accumulated data creates
trouble for ALPR207 by moving away from Graham’s discrete acts and
thus indeed changing “the law as it now stands . . . whereby traditional
surveillance becomes a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ [] after some
specified period of time.”208 But there was a discrete act in Carpenter,
when the government requested the CSLI from the defendant’s phone
provider.209 Chief Justice Roberts’ Carpenter ruling contains a clear ex
ante instruction to law enforcement regarding CSLI: “the Government’s
obligation is a familiar one—get a warrant.”210
Any ex post ALPR analysis is further compounded by the fact that
various agencies swap their ALPR data with each other, sometimes
without even knowing that they are doing so.211 This takes the above
scenario to a new dimension, in that access to another government
agency’s database—the neighboring towns, for example—could, in the
eyes of the McCarthy court, push the collection over the imaginary line
well after the fact, perhaps even while a case was on appeal. This would
be a nonsensical result, as there would be no new material evidence that
should have any bearing on the case.

203. Id. (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181).
204. Id. at 521 (citations omitted); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 306 (1999)
(finding that “practical realities . . . militate in favor of the needs of law enforcement”).
205. Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 521–22.
206. Compare id. at 525–26, with Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
207. E.g., Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 357, 393
(2019) (concluding that ALPR usage “is likely to be a very close call” after Carpenter).
208. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 401 (D. Md. 2012); see also discussion
supra Section III.A.
209. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
210. Id. at 2221.
211. Records requests by a team of researchers found 2.5 billion scans among 173
responding agencies over 2016–17. Each agency shared directly with an average of 160 others
and upwards of 850. One denied participating but eventually admitted that while it did not have
any scanners of its own, it could access over 500 other agencies’. Dave Maass & Beryl Lipton,
Data Driven: Explore How Cops Are Collecting and Sharing Our Travel Patterns Using
Automated License Plate Readers, MUCKROCK (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.muckrock.com/
news/archives/2018/nov/15/alpr-landing-page/ [https://perma.cc/MVF9-K4RN].
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In all, Professor Kerr212 was prescient when he first considered the
mosaic theory back in 2010 and stated, “I don’t see what principles there
are that could keep it from becoming an extraordinary mess.”213
IV. NON-JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES TO BETTER BALANCE ALPR USAGE
The mosaic theory should not be adopted by the courts to strike down
ALPR usage for all the reasons listed above. Doing so would move away
from decades of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and, by threatening a
network of thousands of ALPRs across the nation, amount to legislating
from the bench. If the documented crime-solving successes of ALPR214
do not outweigh the privacy concerns in the eyes of society, then that is
something that legislators can readily address. Individual agencies can
also take steps to regulate themselves to quell public concern. On the
other hand, parking regulations introduced to effectuate ALPR use have
introduced new concerns about safety. This part addresses each nonjudicial alternative in turn.
A. Data Retention Limits by Legislation
If this method of surveillance is something that society regards as not
worthwhile, the practical solution is legislative. In one of the Jones
concurrences, Justice Alito agreed when he wrote that “[i]n
circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution
to privacy concerns may be legislative.”215 The late Justice Scalia, the
author of the Jones majority opinion who often favored state’s rights and
a legislative solution,216 would likely agree. One in three states has taken
action in this area, as at least sixteen have statutes directly addressing
ALPRs.217 However, several of those statutes merely mandate
certification, create public records exceptions, or require published
212. The Graham court took judicial notice that Professor Kerr is a leading scholar in this
area, testifying before Congress on privacy issues, and that one of his articles was cited by both
the majority opinion and a concurrence in Jones. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 402 n.14.
213. Kerr, supra note 201.
214. The fact that in-court objections to ALPRs often come on motions to suppress, as in
McCarthy, is indicative of their effectiveness. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090,
1095 (Mass. 2020).
215. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
216. E.g., Lisa Soronen, Justice Scalia’s Impact on State and Local Government, NAT’L
CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.ncsl.org/blog/2016/02/15/justicescalias-impact-on-state-and-local-government.aspx [https://perma.cc/H6G8-ACEA].
217. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont.
Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-statutesregulating-the-use-of-automated-license-plate-readers-alpr-or-alpr-data.aspx [https://perma.cc/
BHU4-4G74] (last updated Apr. 9, 2021).
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policies from the agencies. Only ten states expressly set a data retention
limit by statute,218 which is what would truly limit law enforcement in
favor of privacy protection. States could also give a voice directly to the
people—underreported amid the turmoil involving the 2020 presidential
election were pro-privacy ballot measures (unrelated to ALPR) passed in
California and Michigan.219
The restrictions posed by states vary tremendously. Georgia’s
retention limit is thirty months,220 which would still be problematic for
the McCarthy court, while New Hampshire requires deletion within three
minutes in the absence of a hit.221 Meanwhile, Arkansas was one of the
first states to entirely ban private use.222 While the level of national
awareness and attention has not been as high as that of sports gambling,223
for example, the trend is towards the majority of the states considering
legislating and regulating ALPR use, as multiple states have proposed
new bills since the start of 2019.224 Interestingly, a Massachusetts bill,
which would have required law enforcement agencies to delete all ALPR
data within forty-eight hours of capture, passed a joint committee in
February 2020, two months before the McCarthy opinion, but then
stalled.225
B. Tiered Use of ALPR Data
There is an existing federal statute, at issue in Graham, that could
serve as a template for ALPR—the Stored Communications Act.226 At
the outset, it should be noted that while Carpenter clearly affected the
Act’s application, by invalidating a warrant that issued from it, the
Court’s “opinion did not invalidate [the court order section of the Act]
218. Id.
219. Sidney Fussell, One Clear Message From Voters This Election? More Privacy, WIRED
(Nov. 4, 2020, 8:26 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/one-clear-message-voters-election-moreprivacy [https://perma.cc/RR5T-LUEJ].
220. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-22(b) (2021).
221. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b, VIII (2021).
222. Clara Turnage, High-Tech Devices Help Police in Little Rock, but Some Say Tools such
as License Plate Readers Raise Thorny Issues, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Apr. 1, 2019,
4:30 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/apr/01/high-tech-devices-help-police-inlr-201/ [https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/apr/01/high-tech-devices-help-police-in-lr201/].
223. E.g., Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where
Every State Stands, ESPN: CHALK (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/197
40480/the-united-states-sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization [https://perma.cc/
H2DK-SL46].
224. S.B. 0243, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019); A.B. A7254, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y.
2020).
225. H.B. 3141, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2020).
226. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 396 (D. Md. 2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
12.
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whole cloth.”227 There is a framework in the Stored Communications Act
that could serve as the basis for a national ALPR statute. Notably, Section
2703(d) of the Act calls for “specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of . . . the records
or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation” before a warrant will issue.228 An analogous
ALPR statute could still allow real-time “hotlist” monitoring229 but
require law enforcement to show grounds before a neutral magistrate
before accessing historic information that might reveal a pattern of
movements of the sort that concern proponents of the mosaic theory. Also
of note, language similar to the current limitation in the Act that “a court
order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State”230 could serve
to allow each state to set ALPR data retention limits of its own choosing.
C. Individual Agency Adjustments and Oversight
If state legislators cannot reach a consensus to balance privacy with
ALPR use, individual municipalities and agencies are free to set their own
restrictions, and many have. For example, Minnesota’s overall state limit
for retaining license plate data is sixty days, but the Minnesota State
Patrol’s is forty-eight hours.231 Compare this to the NYPD’s five years.232
In response to criticism on Fourth Amendment grounds, the NYPD
Deputy Commissioner—apparently briefed on jurisprudence in this
area—stated that he did not think that their system “violates anyone’s
expectation of privacy.”233
Lobbying efforts to resist ALPR regulation have reached as high as
the federal level,234 but despite this, some oversight is finally coming to
the NYPD.235 First introduced in 2017 and met with “fierce opposition”
from the NYPD,236 the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology
227. United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 2019).
228. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
229. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
230. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
231. MINN. STAT. § 13.824 (2020); Minnesota State Patrol Audit, MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE
(Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.leg.mn.gov/docs/2020/mandated/200650.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F8GP-567A].
232. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12.
233. Francescani, supra note 11.
234. E.g., Cyrus Farivar, Cops Are Freaked Out That Congress May Impose License Plate
Reader Limits, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 15, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2015/03/cops-are-freaked-out-that-congress-may-impose-license-plate-reader-limits/
[https://perma.cc/8Z2B-VT62].
235. See Francescani, supra note 11 (“There [was] no outside monitoring of this system at
all.”).
236. Ángel Díaz, A Bill to Oversee 21st Century Police Surveillance, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/bill-oversee21st-century-police-surveillance [https://perma.cc/9ML5-JL3W].
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(POST) Act finally passed the New York City Council in June of 2020.237
The Act required the NYPD to publish policies by January of 2021 that
describe all of their surveillance technologies (including ALPR), their
oversight mechanisms, and the procedures to prevent abuse.238 Major
cities such as San Francisco and Seattle have already passed more
stringent laws than the POST Act, and some jurisdictions require outside
approval before acquiring new surveillance technology.239
Departments that do employ ALPRs should take care that they do so
evenly. A 2020 Buffalo TV news investigation discovered that other than
a few on the international border, the remainder of the city’s readers “are
laser focused on Buffalo’s east side,” with ten percent of the over 40
million reads from the prior year coming from just two streets.240 A
Buffalo police captain defended the deployment, stating that violent
crime is disproportionate on the east side.241 Disproportionate policing,
however, is likely to only exacerbate the discrepancy because of what is
known as collider bias—“if there’s bias in who the police choose to
interact with—if it’s not a random sample—that can change the
relationships you see in the data.”242 Predictive policing has been
criticized for amounting to racial profiling,243 and here, recent evidence
shows that ALPR use leads to disproportionate attention on poor and
minority communities.244 The Buffalo Common Council President said
that he is looking into it, as he agreed that ALPR cameras “should be
equally distributed across the city.”245
There are additional steps that agencies can take to ensure the privacy
of its citizens and safeguard against misuse.246 For example, if officers
237. The Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) Act: A Resource Page,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/publicoversight-surveillance-technology-post-act-resource-page [https://perma.cc/P7SF-96X5] (last
updated Mar. 5, 2021).
238. Id.; see Technology & Equipment - NYPD, NYC: NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/
nypd/about/about-nypd/equipment-and-tools.page [https://perma.cc/3ZSH-YFFH] (last visited
Jan. 11, 2022).
239. Díaz, supra note 236.
240. Ed Drantch, You’re Being Recorded: Millions of License Plates Tracked with Automatic
Plate Readers in Buffalo, WKBW BUFFALO (Nov. 19, 2020, 11:27 PM),
https://www.wkbw.com/news/i-team/youre-being-recorded-millions-of-license-plates-trackedwith-automatic-plate-readers-in-buffalo [https://perma.cc/4YQR-2GHC].
241. Id.
242. Laura Bronner, Why Statistics Don’t Capture the Full Extent of the Systemic Bias In
Policing, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 25, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-statisticsdont-capture-the-full-extent-of-the-systemic-bias-in-policing/ [https://perma.cc/U78B-NS9W].
243. Id.; see also Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV.
109 (2017).
244. Simonite, supra note 6.
245. Bronner, supra note 242.
246. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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insist on being able to look back multiple months, the agency could set a
soft deadline of one month, at which point the older data would be
migrated to an offline server that could only be accessed from the main
office.247 Further, that server could be configured to require a tracked
login that registers an articulated statement of purpose for each query, at
the level of reasonable suspicion.248 Also, once that soft deadline is hit,
inter-agency sharing should cease as well, in the form of removal from
any other database. Finally, at the officer level, all ALPR users on the
ground should visually verify the plate for a match to avoid mis-reads.249
D. Ripple Effects for Vehicle Safety
In states around the country that do not require front license plates,
enhancing the efficacy of mobile ALPRs has led to new regulations that
prohibit back-in parking.250 One Florida university that enacted this
policy in 2019 in conjunction with its introduction of ALPR251was met
with resistance in the form of a petition that has been signed by over 1,500
people, even though the petition did not mention ALPRs.252 Rather, it
raised safety concerns in slowing exits from structures at nighttime, and
it referenced a study that estimated that hundreds of deaths annually and
thousands of injuries result from nose-in parking.253 Since such parking
regulations are only in place to reveal license plates, the twenty states that
do not have a front license plate requirement254 would be well-advised to
allow, if not mandate, a duplicate front plate to give drivers an option to
avoid nose-in parking.

247. See Simonite, supra note 6 (“California’s Highway Patrol must delete ALPR data after
60 days unless it is being used as evidence of a felony.”); H.B. 3141, 191st Gen. Court (Mass.
2020).
248. See Julia Coin, License Plate Readers Installed in UF Area, THE GAINESVILLE SUN
(Nov. 28, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.gainesville.com/story/news/local/2020/11/28/licenseplate-readers-installed-near-university-florida-campus/6423509002/ [https://perma.cc/QM6TF6XH] (“Officers can’t anonymously run tags and look for exes”); cf. Simonite, supra note 6
(noting that “Los Angeles law enforcement agencies made tens of thousands of license plate
queries each year”).
249. Cf. sources cited supra note 6. Section 3(b) of the proposed Massachusetts bill would
require this. H.B. 3141, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2020).
250. E.g., Weiner, supra note 119.
251. Id.
252. Heather Landers, Park Safely in the University Central Fla Parking Structures,
CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/university-central-florida-park-safely-in-the-universitycentral-fla-parking-structures [https://perma.cc/6USL-HYYD] (last visited Jan. 7, 2022).
253. Id.
254. Which States Require a Front License Plate?, AUTOLIST (May 11, 2020),
https://www.autolist.com/guides/front-license-plate [https://perma.cc/E7QX-J6TL].
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CONCLUSION
ALPR use is becoming commonplace in our society, as new locales
continue to adopt them on a regular basis.255 The mosaic theory is an
appealing theory to protect citizens against evolving and encroaching
government surveillance, but ALPRs are not the appropriate technology
against which to wield it. Scans occur only in public once people have
voluntarily ventured out in their vehicles, where there is no expectation
of privacy, no matter the accumulation over time. To attempt to draw a
line would be as difficult as predetermining how many snowflakes it
takes to become a snowball, and any kind of subjective test would unduly
hinder law enforcement’s efforts to use this valuable technology.
Fortunately, there are viable alternatives, available through statutory
reform and regulatory precautions, that can address privacy concerns
while allowing ALPR use.

255. Coincidentally, the author’s university announced the installation of readers in late
2020. Coin, supra note 248.

